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I. Introduction 
 
Crises are often blamed for bringing about abrupt institutional/policy 
changes (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Gorges 2001). Crises are seen 
as providing political leaders with the opportunity to implement new 
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plans. The result is a tendency to link economic crises with radical 
institutional/policy changes. However, this fails to take account of, nor 
does it attempt to understand, those instances where an economic crisis, 
instead of being followed by radical policy change, is followed by 
extant policy continuity. Blaming crises for radical policy change misses 
subtleties at the heart of the process.   
Despite the importance applied to critical junctures in our perception 
of change, our understanding of the concept is limited due to the limited 
attention that has been paid to it (Pierson 2004). Critical junctures have 
been examined using unwieldy frameworks (Collier and Collier 1991; 
Mohoney 2001), counterfactual analysis (Fearon 1996), and case 
specific criteria (Hogan 2005; 2006). This has restricted our ability to 
identify and compare critical junctures, and to differentiate them from 
other forms of change, such as incremental change, that over decades 
might transform a policy or institution. 
Just because a crisis comes before a radical policy change does not 
indicate a cause and effect relationship, which scholars (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Gorges 2001) have 
sometimes assumed. The critical juncture framework developed by 
Hogan and Doyle (2007; 2008) contends that such a linkage is an 
oversimplification, failing to take account of the specific circumstances 
involved. It argues that an economic crisis is a necessary, but 
insufficient, condition for radical economic policy change. According to 
the framework, a critical juncture consists of crisis, ideational change, 
and radical policy change. The framework rests upon the hypothesis that 
a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea –replacing an extant idea– 
leads to significant policy change. Thus, the framework should be 
capable of explaining why certain crises lead to critical junctures in 
policies, whereas others do not, as the differentiating factor between 
them is ideational change. The framework contends that without 
ideational change the level of policy change, in response to a crisis, can 
be o
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II. The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach 
 
Critical junctures are seen as branching points that set processes 
change in motion. The literature sees critical junctures resulting in the 
adoption of an institutional arrangement from among alternatives 
(Mahoney 2000, 512).  Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units 
in a particular direction (Mahoney 2003, 53).   
For some, a critical juncture constitutes a brief period in which one direction 
or another is taken, while for others, it is an extended period of reorientation 
(Mahoney 2001). The concept has been employed in comparative politics.  
Collier and Collier (1991) used a critical juncture framework in their analyses of 
labour movements in Latin America. Mahoney (2001) employed a similar 
framework examining the liberalisation of Central America.  For Collier and 
Collier (1991) and Mahoney (2001) critical junctures took decades to occur. 
Hogan (2005; 2006) questioned whether these periods were instances of 
incremental change, labeled by Streeck and Thelen (2005) periods of 
conversion.  
In relation to short term change, Garrett and Lange (1995, 628) 
showed that electoral landslides created critical junctures by producing 
mandates for policy change. Casper and Taylor (1996) employed the 
concept in analysing liberalisation of authoritarian regimes, while 
Hogan’s (2005; 2006) remoulded the framework to examine change in 
trade union influence over public policy. Karl (1997) employed the 
concept of critical junctures in analyzing how “petro-states” became 
locked into problematic development pathways, while Gal and Bargal 
(2002) used critical junctures to analyze occupational welfare in Israel. 
Flockhart (2005) used critical junctures to explain the gap between 
Danish voters and their politician’s attitudes towards the European 
Union (EU). 
The literature is inconsistent in how it quantifies, and differentiates, 
critical juncutres from other forms of change. However, the fact that 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework is rigorous may resolve 
The Mexican Economic Crisis of 1982 and the Brazilian Economic Crisis of 1999   9 
 
this. It should produce consistent findings, enabling us to determine 
whether the changes to Mexican and Brazilian economic policy 
constituted critical junctures.    
 
 
III. The Countries Selected for Examination 
 
Through studying politics on a comparative basis we can discover 
trends, and achieve an understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel 
1995, 3). The value of comparison is the perspective it offers, and its 
goal of building a body of increasingly complete explanatory theory 
(Mahler 1995). Comparative historical analyses, concerning different 
time periods, is also beneficial (Lieberman 2001, 5). To provide 
different, but comparable cases, we draw our case selections from two 
countries, separated by two decades.   
Mexico in (1981-1983), and Brazil (1999-2003), are examined based 
upon the criteria of “most similar” and “most different”. The selection 
requirements for “most similar” are that both countries are Latin 
America states, in the time periods examined are democratic, and are 
presidential federal republics. Both countries’ economies are amongst 
the world’s largest. In terms of differences, Brazil was colonised by the 
Portuguese, while Mexico was colonised by the Spanish, giving them 
different cultural heritages. Brazil is almost 5 times the size of Mexico, 
has twice the population, but has a shorter history as a democracy. In the 
early 1980s Mexico had import substitution policies (Panizza 2005), 
while by the late 1990s Brazil was operating a free market approach 
(Panizza 2005). Their similarities will ensure ‘the contexts of analysis 
are analytically equivalent, to a significant degree’, while their 
differences will place the ‘parallel processes of change in sharp relief’ 
(Collier 1997, 4).  
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IV. Policy Change and Identification 
 
Policy change must be seen in the context of societal and political 
change. Utilizing Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework, we 
examine macroeconomic policy change in discrete stages. The first 
examines the economy to see if it was in crisis. A crisis implies 
prevailing policy cannot be sustained without deterioration (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995, 14). To test for economic crisis we develop 
observable implications. The framework’s second stage tests for 
ideational change. New ideas can change the policy environment 
(Pemberton 2000, 790). But, how ideas influence policy is something 
theorists have long grappled with (Taylor 1993). Where do ideas come 
from? How do they relate to failing policies? Why do ideas underlying a 
failing policy sometimes change, resulting in policy change, whereas 
other times they remain unaltered? To answer this, a second set of 
observables, based on Legro (2000), are set out. The framework’s third 
stage tests for policy change. These observables are based upon Hall 
(1993), tying together the concepts of policy change, societal learning, 
and the state.   
 
Ⅳ.1. Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis 
 
Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make significant 
structural changes possible as they render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett 
1993, 522). However, economic crises are rare, rendering definition 
difficult (Yu et al. 2006, 439). How do we identify a crisis? For Stone 
(1989, 299) a situation does not become a problem until it is controllable. 
But, it is controllable it must be measurable, otherwise how would we 
know if we are controlling it? Thus, even economic crises must be 
quantifiable. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated examining individual variables when 
quantifying currency crises. Pei and Adesnik (2000, 138-139) developed a 
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range of criteria for identifying macroeconomic crises: annual inflation 
greater than 15 percent, stagnant gross domestic product (GDP), and 
historians and other analysts’ descriptions of deterioration in economic 
circumstances. Frankel and Rose (1996, 351) define a “macroeconomic 
crisis” as a stagnant economy, where investment is in decline, inflation, 
interest rates, and unemployment are above 15 percent, and actors 
perceive an economic crisis. For Solimano (2005, 76) a macro-economic 
crisis can be identified through indicators and perceptions of growth, 
inflation, employment creation, and poverty. 
We seek to identify macro-economic crises through quantitative and 
qualitative measures. Defining anything as a crisis, including a macro-
economic downturn, requires subjective and objective deliberations (Pei 
and Adesnik 2000, 139). Consequently, González (2005, 93) suggests 
adopting a multifaceted approach. Agents must diagnose, and impose on 
others, their notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve 
uncertainty can take meaningful form (Blyth 2002, 9).   
We use a range of observable implications which seek to identify 
change in nominal economic performance, as well as in perceptions of 
economic health (Hogan and Doyle 2007; 2008). 
 
01. If GDP growth was stagnant/negative, the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
02. If debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 percent, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
03. If inflation was above 15 percent (Pei and Adesnik 2000), the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
04. If the interest rate was above 15 percent, the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
05. If unemployment was above 15 percent, the economy may have 
been in crisis. 
06. If opinion polls find the public regard the economic in crisis, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
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07. If the media regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
08. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in 
crisis, the economy may have been in crisis. 
09. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy 
may have been in crisis. 
10. If both domestic and international organisations monitoring 
economic performance regarded the economy in crisis, then the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
11. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the 
economy may have been in crisis. 
12. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent 
with a crisis management approach, the economy may have been 
in crisis. 
 
The Mexican Economy in the Early 1980s  
After 1945 Mexico sought growth through import substitution 
(Narula 2002). Industries developed behind import quotas. This 
increased the country’s international trade, decreasing its foreign 
dependence. The model succeeded as there was demand for Mexican 
raw materials. However, it created a private sector dependent upon state 
protection (Hernández 2008).
2)
 
President Echeverria’s (1970-1976) administration allowed fiscal and 
monetary discipline collapse (Serra-Puche 2008),
3)
 marking the exhaustion 
of the policy of “stabilising development” (Narula 2002). Rubio (2008) 
4)
 
                                                 
2) Luis Miguel Beristain Hernández, PhD. in Administrative Sciences. Business and 
Politics professor, Director of Professional Development, Enterprise Development and 
Social Development at ITESM (Interviewed July 2008). 
3) Jaime Serra Puche, PhD. in Economics. Mexican Politician. Secretary of Commerce 
and Industry in 1988; Treasury Secretary in 1994; and Mexico’s representative in 
NAFTA negotiations in early 1990s (Interviewed June 2008). 
4) Luis Rubio, PhD. in Political Science. Mexican writer on politics, and economics 
(Interviewed July 2008). 
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blames the failures of stabilising development on falling agricultural exports, 
rapid population growth, and middle class disillusionment with its inability 
to express itself in a one party (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) 
dominated culture. However, once oil reserves were discovered by 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil company, in the late 1970s 
(Calderón-Madrid 1997), the hope was that oil revenue would stabilise the 
economy. However, this only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis, 
without resolving the economy’s structural problems (Nelson 1990, 95). 
This was evidence of the temporary solutions often sought by Mexico’s 
political elite (Tournaud 2008).
5)
 
Once the country became a net petroleum exporter pressure grew to 
expand public spending. The number of state owned enterprises 
quadrupled to 1,200 (Calderón-Madrid 1997). Under President Portillo 
(1976-1982) expenditure outstripped petroleum revenues and an 
anaemic taxation system (Solís 1981). As a consequence, the economy 
began to overheat (Appendix A). To finance these projects Mexico 
borrowed $78bn. by 1981 (Alarcon and McKinley 1992). The state’s 
share of fixed capital formation increased to 50 percent (Fitzgerald 1978, 
277). As inflation surpassed 25 percent the peso became overvalued, 
and the competiveness of exports, apart from oil, diminished 
(McCaughan 1993). ‘The merchandise trade balance deteriorated’ as 
‘imports rose while nonoil exports earning stagnated’ (Nash 1991, 494). 
Mexico was poorly positioned when oil prices fell in response to a 
weakening world economy in the early 1980s.
6)
 Compounding matters, 
PEMEX and the Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (SPP), 
declared oil production would be insufficient to reactivate the economy.
7)
 
Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican goods, while a sharp 
                                                 
5) Nicolas Foucras Tournaud, PhD. in Political Science. Head of the Political Science 
department, ITEMS (Instituto Tecnológico y De Estudios Superiores de Monterrey) 
Campus Monterrey (Interviewed August 2008). 
6)  Time Magazine, 22 February, 1982. 
7) Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura, January, 1982.  “De Díaz Mirón a 
Díaz Serrano”. 
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increase in interest rates there reduced the money supply, and put 
pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as US banks had lent the country 
$25 billion. Servicing Mexico’s debt reached $16 billion, more than its 
revenues from oil (Cornelius 1985, 89). ‘Collapsing oil prices and rising 
international interest rates erased Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr 2006, 53).   
By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans began 
converting pesos to dollars at 25 billion pesos a day.
8)
 The gravity of the 
situation came to international attention on August 13, 1982, when:   
 
The government fired the shot heard around the world, 
announcing that it could not meet interest payments coming due 
within the next few days and initiating negotiations for bridge 
loans and rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury, the 
IMF, and the private commercial banks (Nelson 1990, 97).  
 
Mexico’s economic indicators pointed towards crisis (Appendix A) 
(Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 1982 
and 4.2 percent in 1983, while the inflation reached 58.92 percent in 
1982 (Katz 1994). Output fell in all industries,
9)
 unemployment jumped 
towards 15 percent,
10)
 while more than 20 million people, half the 
workforce, were underemployed (Cornelius 1985, 92). Compounding 
matters, US banks stopped lending to Mexican companies as they 
already owed US$600 million in interest.
11)
 The budget deficit stood at 
16.5 percent of GDP.
12)
 
In 1983 inflation reached triple digits, the national debt continued to 
rise, and the level of capital formation slackened (Appendix A). 
According to Edwards (1995, 17) this was the worst crisis to hit Mexico 
since the Great Depression. The Third World Magazine,
13)
 Gestión y 
                                                 
8)   Time Magazine, 30 August, 1982. 
9)   ibid. 
10) ibid., 20 December, 1982. 
11) ibid., 1 January, 1983. 
12) ibid., 20 December, 1982. 
13) The Third World Magazine, October, 1983.  “IMF: quick fix- slow poison”. 
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Estrategia,
14)
 and Time Magazine
15)
 referred to Mexico’s difficulties as 
a crisis. Mexican economic magazine Proceso regarded 1982 as 
Mexico’s worst recession.
16)
 The Third World Magazine argued the 
country was effectively bankrupt.
17)
 Minimum wages were insufficient 
to meet the needs of most Mexicans (Lustig 1986). Opinion polls found 
great scepticism concerning the economy (Basañez 1985). 
During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice in order to increase 
exports (Katz 1994), but the economy could not hold onto dollars. New 
short term loans were taken to counteract capital flight, but did nothing 
(Jiménez 2006). Banco de México’s reserves dried up in a matter of 
weeks.
18)
 In his Sixth Annual Presidential Report, Portillo stated that the 
economy was experiencing the worst crisis in its history.
19)
 
Bailey (1980, 54) identified trends that produced economic panic: 
excessive government outlays; $15 billion in short-term loans which 
funded capital flight; an overvalued peso; and dollarization. Despite 
growing by 8 percent annually between 1978 and 1981, by the end of 
1982, Mexico faced one of the severest crises in its history (Barker and 
Brailovsky 1983). 
 
The Brazilian Economy in the Late 1990s 
Brazil undertook an inflation stabilization programme in 1994, the Plano 
Real (Netto 1999), pegging the real to the dollar. Inflation fell from 50 
percent per month in 1995 to 3.2 percent annually by 1998 (Appendix B). 
However, there was substantial exchange rate appreciation, making Brazilian 
goods relatively more expensive, contributing to a current account deficit by 
1997 (Bulmer-Thomas 1999, 730). 
                                                 
14) Gestión y Estrategia, Calderón, Gilberto, July, 1991.  “Privatización de la Banca en México”. 
15) Time Magazine, 15 July, 1987.  “Last Bow of the Inflation Tamer”. 
16) Proceso(1982), Mexican economic and political magazine, “La Devaluación de 1982,” 
No. 306, September 11. 
17) The Third World Magazine, December, 1983. 
18) Latin America Regional Reports, 13 August, 1982, p. 1. 
19) Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1, 1982. 
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Interest rates doubled as the repercussions from the Asian financial 
crisis reached Brazil, indicating the fragility of its situation (Heymann 
2001, 16). Simultaneously, inflation began to rise, reaching 5 percent by 
1999. Nevertheless, the authorities promised a new assault on fiscal 
problems, now aggravated by higher interest on government debt.  
However, the government, with an eye to the 1998 elections, failed to 
make good on its commitments, and the budget deficit grew to 8.4 
percent of GDP. 
Following the Asian crisis, and Russian bond default, investors 
became risk averse (Kaminsky et al. 2003, 51), reflecting the downgrading 
of Brazil’s credit rating.
20)
 As $30 billion fled the country in September 
1998, the central bank raised interest rates to 43 percent. By November 
President Cardoso, safely re-elected, announced measures to slash the 
deficit, and right the economy.
21)
 
However, the real came under speculative attack in November 1998. 
To defend the currency, the central bank pushed interest rates to 50 
percent,
22)
 increasing the cost of servicing public and private debt to the 
extent that investors became convinced a default was inevitable. High 
interest rates, instead of slowing the tide of dollars leaving Brazil, 
accelerated the process. The governor of Minas Gerais’s announcement 
of a 90 day moratorium on debt repayments to the federal government,
23)
 
and fears that the governors of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul 
would do likewise, threatened the country’s fiscal integrity (Rothkopf 
1999, 91), sending investors fleeing the Brazilian capital markets 
(Cattaneo 2001, 228). With the Brazilian central bank losing $2 billion a 
day,
24)
 the World Bank initiated crisis talks. 
                                                 
20) Brazil’s rating in 1999; Moody: B2, S&P: -B; Fitch: -BB. See Moody’s Investor’s 
Service; Standard & Poor’s; Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latin-focus.com/latinfocus/ 
countries/brazil. 
21) The Economist, 21 November, 1998, p. 23. 
22) The Independent, 4 December, 1999, p. 18. 
23) Business and Finance, 25 January, 1999, p. 36. 
24) The Evening Standard, 15 January, 1999, p. 41. 
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A $41 billion IMF-led rescue package was arranged.
25)
 But, President 
Cardoso was unable to get an appropriate budget (tax increases/spending 
cuts) approved.
26)
 The possibility of default arose. The upper classes, 
convinced devaluation of the real inevitable, began withdrawing 
investment from Brazil. The fall in gross capital formation for 1998 
reflected this capital flight (Table 2). As foreign direct investment (FDI) 
went elsewhere the prospects for the economy, and the value of the real, 
grew bleak. Unemployment hit 9 percent by the end of 1998. 
Despite pledges not to do so,
27)
 the exchange rate band was widened 
to accommodate devaluation in January 1999 (Roett and Crandall 1999, 
279). While the real/dollar exchange rate, which had been close to 
parity, plummeted to two for one by February. Debt services as a 
percentage of exports reached 117 percent by 1999.
28)
 Devaluation also 
put pressure on the central bank as its diminishing foreign currency 
reserves were the only thing preventing further devaluation.
29)
 However, 
devaluation did not stop the haemorrhage of dollars.  
On the day of devaluation, the Sao Paulo stock exchange fell 10 
percent and within a few weeks this policy collapsed, forcing the 
resignation of a second central bank governor. Arminio Fraga, the new 
governor, floated the currency,
30)
 but the country plunged into recession 
with declines in industrial output and GNP.
31)
 The percentage of the 
population below the poverty line surpassed 25 percent.
32)
 The New York 
Times –observing that Brazil was in crisis, with capital fleeing, and state 
governments defying the central authority
33)
– predicted a debt default.
34)
 
                                                 
25) ibid., 30 January, 1999, p. S12. 
26) The New York Times, 28 February, 1999, p. 1. 
27) The Washington Post, 11 February, 1999, p. A31. 
28) The Independent, 14 January, 1999, p. 1. 
29) The Daily Mail, 15 January, 1999, p. 65. 
30) Financial Times, 4 March, 1999, p. 6. 
31) Business and Finance, 19 August, 1999, p. 10. 
32) Brazil, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=br&v=69 
33) The New York Times, 31 January, 1999, p. 16. 
34) ibid., 31 January, 1999, p. 16. 
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Real GDP was stagnant throughout 1998 and 1999 (Appendix B), while 
GDP per capita fell by 1.39 and 0.7 percent in the same period.
35)
 
However, the inflation did not surpass 7 percent.
36)
 
‘Many commentators assumed Brazil would have to restructure its 
debt (a euphemism for default)’ (Bulmer-Thomas 1999, 736). Summers 
(2000, 5) regarded this as one of the major international financial crises 
of the 1990s.  By early March 1999 the Brazilian central bank was still 
struggling to prop up the real.
37)
 According to Summers and Williamson 
(2001, 56) at the heart of the Brazilian crisis was that its pegged 
exchange rate lacking sufficient institutionalisation of the measures 
necessary to make the peg stick.  
 
<Table 1> The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis 
 
The Observable Implications 
Mexico 
1981-
1983 
Brazil 
1999-
2003 
01. Was GDP growth was stagnant? X X 
02. Was total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100%? X  
03. Was annual inflation was above 15%? X  
04. Was the annual interest rate was above 15%? X X 
05. Was the annual unemployment rate was above 15%? X  
06. Did opinion polls find the public regarded the economic 
in crisis? 
X X 
07. Did the media regard the economy in crisis? X X 
08. Did economic and political commentators regard the 
economy in crisis? 
X X 
09. Did the central bank regard the economy as in crisis? X X 
10. Did domestic/international organisations regard the 
economy as in crisis? 
X X 
                                                 
35) Data Gob, Governance Indicators Database, http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/ 
36) The Economic Intelligence Unit - Country Report, Brazil, March, 2003. 
37) The Times, 3 March, 1999, p. 12. 
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11. Did elected representatives regard the economy as in 
crisis? 
X X 
12. Were gov pronouncements on the economy were 
consistent with a crisis management approach? 
X X 
Economic Crisis X X 
 
According to the framework Mexico experienced a macroeconomic 
crisis, as it satisfied all observable implications (Table 1). The economy 
was stagnant, debt out of control, inflation and interest rates very high, 
and the general perception amongst politicians, economic commentators, 
and the media, was of crisis. Although Brazil (1998-2000) satisfied only 
70 percent of the observables (Table 1), we argue that it experienced an 
economic crisis. This is because its economy was stagnant, investment 
was declining, and the media, public, and economic commentators, 
regarded the economy in a crisis.   
In terms of severity, Mexico’s crisis was more acute than Brazil’s. 
This is clear from developments in Mexico at the time, and is also borne 
out by all of the above observables pointed to a crisis there. Thus, 
although both states experienced economic crises during the years in 
question, their severity differed. Holding with Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 
2008) critical juncture framework, which argues that a crisis induced 
consolidation of a new idea –replacing an extant idea– can lead to 
significant policy change, the next section will see if ideas underlying 
the economic policies in both states changed at these times. 
 
Ⅳ.2. Testing for Ideational Change 
 
Previous policies can be discredited due to their implication in, or 
inability to right, a crisis (Levy 1994). Although economic crises can 
have great impact they will not determine policy, whose formulation is 
‘centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob 2003, 
375). Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that 
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significant policy change depends upon actors reaching consensus upon, 
and consolidating around, a new set of ideas. This corresponds to 
McNamara’s (1998, 4-5) argument that actors utilize new ideas to chart 
policy strategy.  ‘Ideas facilitate the reduction of […] barriers by acting 
as coalition-building resources among agents who attempt to resolve the 
crisis’ (Blyth 2002, 37). Ideas are the casual mechanisms of change in a 
critical juncture (Golob 2003). Thus, ideational change stands between a 
crisis and policy change. 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that new ideas 
are introduced by three groups of change agents. Combinations of these 
agents constitute a policy network (Hall 1993). The most important are 
what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political entrepreneurs’. Political entrepreneurs 
‘exploit moments of instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a 
new policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action’ (Sheingate 
2003, 188-190). In a crisis, a political leader, usually an opposition 
leader, will seek new ideas to rectify the ills of an existing policy 
paradigm. The second group are Kingdon’s (1995, 179-183) ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’. These are agents who spread ideas to replace the current 
paradigm. They may be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists 
and interest groups. The final group of change agents consists of outside 
influences: the media, the OECD, IMF and the World Bank. They 
critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a new one. Both 
policy entrepreneurs and outside influences are responsible for 
producing ideas, but, political entrepreneurs introduce ideas into the 
policy process. 
According to Legro’s (2000, 419) two-stage model of ideational 
change, if agents agree the existing paradigm is deficient and should be 
replaced, the first stage –ideational collapse– has occurred. These are the 
observables for ideational collapse: 
 
Ideational Collapse 
01. The media questions the efficacy of the current model.  
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02. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose 
alternative ideas –at election time their platform will be built around 
these alternatives. 
03. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations, 
consumer groups etc. critique the current model. 
04. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable 
through opinion polls, protests etc. 
05. External/international organizations critique the current model 
and/or actively disseminate alternative ideas. 
 
Change agents in the form of policy entrepreneurs, and outside 
influences, propose a solutions. However, ‘even when ideational 
collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement could still 
produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ 
(Legro 2000, 424). The crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set 
of ideas. If consensus is achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s 
model –consolidation– agents coordinating a replacement set of ideas. 
This can be seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating innovations by 
combining a mixture of interests to produce a winning coalition 
(Sheingate 2003, 192-193). Oliver and Pemberton (2004) identified this 
process as “policy learning”. Below are the observables for new 
ideational consolidation. 
 
New Ideational Consolidation 
06. Clear alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs, are 
evident. 
07. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) injecting new ideas 
into the policy arena is evident. 
08. The Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to 
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm. 
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Policies are protected by underlying ideas. The greater the consensus 
encompassing an idea the more protected the policies derived from it. 
Protected policies represent continuity, whereby once a policy has 
become institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible 
only in terms of these ideas’ (Blyth 2001, 4). Referring to policies as 
protected is similar to Golob’s notion of ‘policy frontiers’ (2003, 363). 
 
The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy 
Populist-redistributive models were implemented by PRI presidents 
between 1934 and 1976 (Sandersen 1983, 319). When Portillo came to 
office he was forced to contemplate reduced expenditure due to the oil 
crisis (Woodhead 1980). However, the discovery of oil changed 
everything, with Portillo adopting a patronage model embracing 
industrialisation and expansive state expenditure (Bailey 1980). This 
produced high growth, however, the economy remained vulnerable. 
 
Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive 
policies-especially tax reform-would have entailed, the Portillo 
administration (1976-1982) sought to expand the entire 
economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy, 
as banker, entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius 1985, 88). 
 
Despite oil revenues, the economy became fuelled on borrowing and 
declining real wages.
38)
 However, once oil prices fell, and interest rates 
spiked, Mexico faced the prospect of debt default. The ideas underlying 
extant economic policy underwent a rethink. By mid March 1982, 
President Portillo’s administration introduced an economic stabilization 
plan.
39)
 
During the 1982 presidential election all contenders focused on the 
crisis. Miguel De La Madrid, a fiscal conservative, was the PRI’s 
                                                 
38) The Times, 10 September, 1982. 
39) Time Magazine, 29 March, 1982. 
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presidential candidate.
40)
 He was ‘among the leaders of the conservative 
faction based in the treasury’ (Nelson 1990, 98). Shifts in a more 
conservative direction within the PRI led to De La Madrid’s selection 
(Villegas 1981). Mexican society was in turmoil, and free market 
supporters wanted a president who would support the rights of private 
property (Luna et al. 1987). The choice of De La Madrid constituted a 
rupture with the PRI’s revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas 2008).
41)
 
During the campaign, De La Madrid stressed the differences between 
his proposed government and that of Portillo. “Crises come about 
because the government tries to consolidate all interests at the same time 
[...]” declared De La Madrid.
42)
 His proposed government would 
mobilise resources to change the economy’s direction.
43)
 ‘In the post-
1982 environment, policy options and instruments appeared limited [for 
Mexico], which as a debtor was subject to the conditionality imposed by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ (Golob 2003, 375).   
In his inauguration address De La Madrid declared that a new 
economic approach was needed.
44)
 Sources of external finance dried up 
in the aftermath of the crisis, while oil revenues remained stagnant 
(Hernández 2008).  Locked into a harsh IMF bailout, negotiated by the 
outgoing administration, De La Madrid presented a programme for 
policy change.
45)
 To maintain economic, political, and social order, a 
break with the past was required. Acting as a political entrepreneur, De 
La Madrid selected his ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI 
(Nelson 1990, 98). He wanted to take policy to the right, stabilizing and 
opening the economy (Lustig 1992, 28). The new administration 
                                                 
40) ibid., 5 October, 1981. 
41) Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Mexican politician, active in Mexican politics in the 1980s 
and important political representative of Mexico’s opposition parties (Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática [PRD]). 
42) Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2. 
43) ibid. 
44) First Annual Presidential Report of President Miguel De La Madrid, 1September, 1983. 
45) La Devaluación, 11 September, 1982, No. 306. 
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prioritized integration into the world economy by attracting FDI; and 
focusing on high tech industries.  
 
The Ideas Underlying Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy 
The state played an important role in Brazil’s development (Goldstein 
1999, 675). After the first oil crisis the Geisel administration 
implemented an expansionary growth strategy (Pinheiro and Giambiagi 
1999, 7). However, the rising nation debt burdened the economy, and as 
interest rates rose servicing this debt became problematic (Baer 2001). 
GDP growth stagnated to 1.2 percent per annum during the 1980s (Berg 
et al. 2006, 46). After a half century of import-substitution industrialisation 
the economy was opened in 1990 under President Collor (Berg et al. 
2006, 49).   
The 2002 election saw widespread discontent with the market model 
due to the Real Crisis and persistent indigence (Samuels 2006). Luiz 
Inácio Lula de Silva and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) initially 
contested the election attacking the market-friendly policies of Cardoso. 
The PT’s program for government, Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa 
de Governo do PT para o Brasil emphasized state intervention and 
poverty reduction.
46)
 Public opinion echoed these sentiments.
47)
 
Following market jitters concerning statist policies, Lula announced 
he would not reverse capitalist reforms, but would seek to make them 
fairer.
48)
 Market fears were exacerbated by the meltdown of the 
Argentine economy, and worries that Brazil might also default.
49)
 
Investor anxiousness sent the value of the Real tumbling again.
50)
 In 
                                                 
46) Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa de Governo do PT para o Brasil, Partido dos 
Trabalhadores(2002), São Paulo. 
47) Latinobarómetro(2003), Informe Resumen: La Democracia y la Economía -available 
at http://www.latinobarometro.org/fileadmin/documentos/prensa/Espanol/2003.pdf 
48) Time Magazine, 19 August, 2002. 
49) ibid. 
50) ibid., 2 December, 2002. 
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response, the PT released a toned down Programa de Governo do PT.
51)
 
Just before the election, to assuage investors confidence, Lula released 
Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the People of Brazil). It stated that 
he was not going to implement the leftist ideology of the PT if elected 
(Flynn 2005, 1246). It suggested he would seek to ensure economic 
stability, and did not criticize free market policies.
52)
 Lula was cognisant 
of his impact upon the market, and ‘that economic autarchy [was] not an 
option for an export-driven economic powerhouse’.
53)
 He recognised 
that a program that might result in default would make it difficult for 
him to implement his social policies.
54)
 
Ideational contestation occurred, but Lula failed to present an 
alternative to an open economy. Recognising economic realities, he 
moderated his rhetoric, and moved to the right.
55)
 Closing the economy, 
and renationalizing firms, would scare investor (Weyland 2004, 144). 
Throughout the campaign Lula sought to ‘reassure foreign investors and 
financial markets that he [was] not a reckless Marxist firebrand’.
56)
 His 
only sop to the past was to call for an end to outright privatisations 
(unremarkable, as little was left to sell). Lula came to recognise the need 
for growth within the context of the extant economic regime, in order to 
achieve his social agenda.
57)
 No alternative idea to the open economy 
was consolidated.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51) Programa de Governo do PT, A Herança Social, Partido dos Trabalhadores(2002), 
São Paulo, parágrafos 21 & 22. 
52) Carta ao Povo Brasileiro, Partido dos Trabalhadores(2002), São Paulo. 
53) Time Magazine, 4 October, 2002. 
54) ibid. 
55) The Washington Times, 24 November, 2002, p. 2. 
56) The New York Times, 30 October, 2002, p. 26. 
57) The Washington Post, 6 November, 2002, p. 1. 
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<Table 2> The Identification of Ideational Change 
 
The Observable Implications 
Mexico Brazil 
1981-
1983 
1999-
2003 
Ideational Collapse   
01. Media questioning efficacy of current model. X  
02. Opposition parties critique current model and propose 
alternative ideas - at elections their platform are built around 
these alternative ideas. 
X X 
03. Civil society organisations critique the current model.  X X 
04. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, 
observable through opinion polls, protests etc. 
X X 
05. External or international organisations critique current 
model or, actively disseminate alternative economic ideas. 
X  
   
New Ideational Consolidation Y Y 
06. Clear alternative ideas are evident X  
07. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject these 
new ideas into policy arena is evident 
X  
08. Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to 
produce consensus around a replacement paradigm 
X  
Adoption of New Idea Y N 
 
In relation to Mexico, see from (Table 2) that all observable implications 
concerning extant ideational collapse, and new consolidation, were 
satisfied. Vast expenditure, based on the belief that oil revenues could 
support rapid industrialisation, led the country to the brink of 
bankruptcy. This resulted in widespread criticism of the economic 
policy of import substitution, and as a result the ideas underpinning it 
collapsed. De La Madrid, acting as a political entrepreneur, championed 
a new set of ideas on opening the economy.  
For Brazil, we see from (Table 2) that three of the observable 
implications concerning ideational collapse were satisfied, while no 
observable for new ideational consolidation was. Although the free 
market model was challenged in Brazil, no viable alternative was 
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presented. Lula’s opposition to economic openness mellowed as he 
came to recognise that turning his back on international finance/markets 
would make it impossible to achieve his social policies. 
Thus, although both countries experienced economic crises, only in 
Mexico did the ideas on how to manage the economy change. There, 
changes agents, led by a political entrepreneur in De La Madrid, 
consolidated around a replacement set of idea. In Brazil, a political 
entrepreneur, willing to take policy in a new direction, was absent.    
Next we examine both countries for changes in economic policy. 
Based on the results so far, Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework 
leads us to anticipate finding radical economic policy change in Mexico, 
due to ideational change, but not in Brazil, due to the absence of 
ideational change.   
 
Ⅳ.3. Identification of Policy Change  
 
McNamara (1998) argues that new ideas change the wider policy 
environment. The level of policy change depends upon the preceding 
variables, but is also central to determining if there was a critical 
juncture. Based on Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework we 
hypothesise that once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation 
around a new set of ideas policy change should follow. The observable 
implications are based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, second, and 
third order change. Hall (1993, 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and 
policy failures, discredit the old paradigm, leading to a re-examination 
of the belief systems through which that policy was created –a 
paradigmatic, or third order, change. The observables set out below 
enable us identify, and differentiate, normal and fundamental shifts in 
policy. They also incorporate the notion of swift and enduring change 
(Hogan 2005).   
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01. If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for 
longer than one government’s term of office) there may have 
been a radical change in government economic policy.  
02. If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for 
longer than one government’s term of office) there may have 
been a radical change in government economic policy.  
03. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly 
and for longer than one government’s term of office) there may 
have been a radical change in government economic policy.  
  
Mexican Economic Policy 
The first policy response to the crisis, from Portillo’s administration, 
sought to keep domestic interest rates competitive (Looney 1985, 112), 
while incentivising exports. For decades free trade was ‘the policy 
option that dare not speak its name’ (Golob 2003, 370). In his inaugural 
address in December 1982
58)
 De La Madrid outlined an austerity 
program –Programa Inmediato de Reordenación Económica (Lustig 
1998, 29). He sent a draconian budget to Congress,
59)
 while the budgets 
of 1982-1984 represented sustained austerity (Cornelius 1985, 117).  
The ideas underlying state-led development, based on import 
substitution industrialisation collapsed. The government ‘embraced an 
approach toward liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation’ (Pastor 
and Wise 1997,  421). These policies had a significant impact upon 
Mexico’s economic, and social, development (Cornelius 1985, 84). The 
new approach to the economy focused on using international forces as 
promoters of liberalisation (Middlebrook 2004). However, a major 
concern was Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign markets, and its 
inadequate level of saving.
60)
 De La Madrid’s administration signalled 
its desire for new FDI by relaxing restrictive FDI laws (Cornelius 1985, 
                                                 
58) ibid. 
59) ibid. 
60) Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2. 
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115), permitting Mexican businesses form international partnerships 
(Tournaud 2008). 
De La Madrid pegged the peso at a more “realistic” exchange rate, 
and introduced plans to restructure the bureaucracy.  He implemented 
conventional monetary and fiscal austerity, more extensive trade 
liberalisation, and a less confrontational approach to the IMF (Nelson 
1990, 63). ‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace [was] a major break-
through’ (ISG 1982, 1720), as it permitted Mexico avoid a debt 
moratorium (Looney 1985, 121). The initial adjustment package sought 
to ameliorate external debt through a reduction of government spending 
and devaluation. This enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing 
the public sector deficit, unfortunately it had a severe recessionary 
impact (Pastor and Wise 1997, 421). 
De La Madrid recognised that his administration could not rely on oil 
exports.
61)
 The solution to financing development was sought through 
privatising public enterprises, of which 1,155 were sold off (Hernández 
2008). De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic stabilisation 
and structural change, with a focus on export orientated manufacturing 
(Cornelius 1985, 110). This was part of the objective of integrating 
Mexico into the world economy.   
The relationship between the private sector and the state transformed 
(Middlebrook 2004). The neoliberal reforms made the private sector a 
key player in reviving the economy (Beristain 2008; Tournaud 2008). 
Business organisations became engaged in debates over economic 
policy, where previously the private sector had been kept at a distance 
(Golob 2003, 371). 
De La Madrid’s approach focused on development with a social 
objective, but based upon economic reality.
62)
 Reform changed the 
country’s social ideology (Hernández 2008; Rubio 2008). Thus, 
Mexican economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982 
                                                 
61) The Third World Magazine, December, 1983, p. 72. 
62) Latin America Regional Reports, 4 June, 1982, pp. 1-2. 
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(Cárdenas 2008; Serra-Puche 2008). Mexico started down a different 
path under De La Madrid. In the wake of economic crisis, and change in 
the ideas underlying economic policy, Mexico experienced a third-order 
macroeconomic policy change. The market replaced regulation, private 
ownership replaced public ownership, and competition replaced 
protectionism (Pastor and Wise 1997, 421). 
 
Brazilian Economic Policy 
Prior to his inauguration investors were concerned that Lula would be 
unable to manage the 9
th
 largest economy in the world, and that his 
policies would be dominated by PT ideology (Flynn 2005, 1245). They 
also feared a debt default, as in Argentina. When Lula assumed office in 
January 2003 his appointment of Antonio Palocci, who had privatised 
utilities during the 1990s, as finance minister, and Henrique Meirelles, a 
free market economist, as head of the Central Bank, signalled his 
economic intentions.
63)
 His economic staff was made up of those who 
had abandoned the populist ideas of the PT (de Castro and de Carvalho 
2003, 484). Palocci assured investors that the new government would 
pursue fiscal restraint, low inflation and an open market.
64)
 
This assuaged fears of a lurch to the left (Edwards 2007, 74). The PT 
government, abandoning radicalism, maintained the free market, and 
budgetary stability, of its predecessors. It kept a grip on the money 
supply and implemented severe spending cuts.
65)
 By not taking the 
economy in a new direction, but working within established frameworks, 
financial markets gained confidence (Edwards 2007, 73).   
Instead of revising Brazilian macroeconomic policy the PT reversed 
its own position, as signalled in the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro. Some saw 
this adoption of the economic program of the outgoing Cardoso 
administration as betrayal of the ideals upon which the PT was founded 
                                                 
63) Time Magazine, 2 March, 2003. 
64) O Estado de São Paulo, 18 December, 2002, p. 18. 
65) New York Times, 10 April, 2003, p. 10. 
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(Bourne 2008, 153). Radicalism was replaced with an orthodox 
approach to economic management. Nevertheless, improved the 
exchange rate, and reduced the risks associated with Brazilian 
government bonds. The economy responded, growing by 5 percent in 
2004, up from 0.5 percent in 2003 (Flynn 2005, 1223), and it began to 
run a current account surplus.     
The president established a number of high profile posts on social 
policy, to help the poor (de Castro and de Carvalho 2003, 484). Lula, 
through medidas provisória (provisional decree) 144/03, ensured the 
state electricity company, Eltrobras, and its subsidiaries Eletronorte, 
Chesf, Furnas and Eletrosul would be exempt from the Programa 
Nacional de Desestatização (The National Program of Destatisation: 
PND), created under Collor.
66)
 However, José Dirceu, PT Chief of Staff, 
assured the markets that the government would not re-nationalise 
companies.
67)
 Nevertheless, there was surprise in November 2003, when 
the privatization of state banks, which Lula had opposed while waiting 
to assume office, proceeded.
68)
 To encourage foreign investment, Lula 
unveiled plans for public-private partnerships. Private firms could invest 
in state enterprises, which largely conformed with President Collor’s 
PND. 
By the end of Lula’s first term, it was clear his economic policies 
were a continuation of his predecessor’s. Acceptance of a disciplined 
approach to the economy gained him the support of previously wary 
investors.
69)
 The instrument settings of economic policy may have 
changed, but the instruments and hierarchy of goals underling economic 
policy remain the same. What changed was ‘the PT’s programmatic 
trajectory: the support for the financial economic sector, previously so 
harshly criticized’ (Bianchi and Braga 2005, 1761).  
                                                 
66) Latin America News Digest, 30 January, 2004. 
67) World Markets Analysis, 16 June, 2003. 
68) Gazeta Mercantil, 10 November, 2003. 
69) The Washington Post, 6 November, 2002, p. 1. 
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<Table 3> The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy 
 
The Observable Implications 
Mexico 
1981-1983
Brazil 
1999-2003 
01. If industrial policy instrument settings changed 
there may have been a radical change in 
economic policy  
X X 
02. If the instruments of industrial policy changed 
there may have been radical change in 
economic policy  
X  
03. If the hierarchy of goals behind industrial policy 
changed there may have been a radical change 
in economic policy 
X  
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy Y N 
 
 
In Mexico we identified an economic crisis and ideational change. 
According to the framework, ideational change is the differentiating 
factor between crises that lead to paradigmatic policy changes, and those 
that do not. At the end of the previous section our indentifying 
ideational change in Mexico led us to anticipate a third order change in 
Mexican macroeconomic policy, which we identified in (Table 3). 
According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework, 
the economic crisis, ideational change, and radical change in 
privatisation policy constituted a critical juncture. 
Although there was an economic crisis in Brazil, there was no 
ideational change. The absence of ideational change led us to anticipate 
the absence of radical policy change. This was confirmed in (Table 3). 
The inability of Lula to champion an alternative set of economic idea 
resulted in only a first-order change in economic policy. There was no 
critical juncture in Brazilian macroeconomic policy. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
We examined two economic upheavals, Mexico (1981-1983) and 
Brazil (1999-2003), to determine if there were critical junctures in their 
economic policies. To answer this question we employed Hogan and 
Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework for identifying critical 
junctures. Our findings were a critical juncture in Mexican economic 
policy, but relatively minor change in Brazilian economic policy. 
According to the framework the economic malaise in Mexico (1981-
1983) constituted an economic crisis. The ideational foundations of 
extant economic policy collapsed in 1982, in the midst of this crisis. 
Import substitution and the restrictions imposed upon FDI were 
perceived as failing.  In this context, De La Madrid assumed the role of 
political entrepreneur, fostering an alternative set of ideas on economic 
management. Change agents, led by the political entrepreneur, consolidated 
around the idea of opening the economy to free trade - a reversal of 
previous policy. De La Madrid altered the setting, instruments, and 
hierarchy of goals behind Mexican economic policy - third order policy 
change. Thus, there was a crisis, ideational change, and radical change 
in economic policy, what the framework rates a critical juncture.   
The framework also identified an economic crisis in the Brazilian 
economy (1999-2003). Although ideational collapse occurred, Lula, the 
likely candidate to fulfil the role of political entrepreneur, declined the 
opportunity to champion change agents’ alternative ideas on managing 
the economy. Consequently, a coherent policy alternative was not 
injected into the policy making environment. Instead, Lula, and his party, 
performed a u-turn, accepting the market friendly ideas of the outgoing 
Cardoso administration, which they had previously criticised. In the 
absence of ideational change there was only a first order change in 
Brazilian economic policy.  
Hogan and Doyle’s framework provided valuable insights into the 
policy change processes in both countries. As the framework possesses a 
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level of rigor the results it produced are comparable, though the cases 
examined are from different countries in different decades. By situating 
the cases in a comparative context, the framework permits us to see how 
changes in economic policy arise. The significance of employing this 
framework is that make the identification of what is, and what is not, a 
critical junctures more straightforward. The early 1980s witnessed a 
dramatic shift in Mexican economic policy, this in the wake of 
economic crisis, collapse of the ideas underlying protectionism, and 
consolidation of a new set of economic ideas under political entrepreneur 
De La Madrid. In Brazil, 20 years later, the absence of a political 
entrepreneur, despite an economic crisis, ensured that an alternative set 
of economic ideas was not consolidated, leaving the foundations of 
extant policy intact. The economic policy changes, instituted by De La 
Madrid, served as a cornerstone for Mexican economic policy going 
forward.   
 
Appendix 
<Appendix A> Mexico’s Economic Indicators, 1977-1983 
 
 
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R. 
B.(2007), International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005. 6th ed., 
Macmillan: Basingstoke; Fleck, S. and C. Sorrentino(1994), “Employment and 
Unemployment in Mexico’s Labour force,” Monthly Labour Review, November (3). 
Year Unemply 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Government 
Debt to 
GNI ratio 
Growth 
Rates in Real 
GDP 
Gross Capital 
Formation % 
of GDP 
1977 8.8 29 39.18 3.38 22.84 
1978 6.9 17.45 35.86 8.96 23.6 
1979 5.7 18.17 32.79 9.69 25.95 
1980 4.2 26.36 30.53 9.22 25.73 
1981 4.2 27.93 32.59 8.77 25.94 
1982 6.8 58.92 53.3 -0.63 21.56 
1983 6.9 101.7 66.53 -4.2 19.77 
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<Appendix B> Brazil’s Economic Indicators, 1997-2003 
 
Year Unemply 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Government Debt 
to GNI ratio 
Growth Rates 
in Real GDP 
Gross Capital 
Formation % of GDP 
1997 7.8 6.9 25.0 3.3 21.5 
1998 9.0 3.2 31.4 0.1 21.1 
1999 9.6 4.8 47.3 0.8 20.4 
2000 12 7 41.7 4 21.5 
2001 9.4 6.84 47.2 1.31 21.2 
2002 10.8 8.45 52.6 1.93 19.9 
2003 9.7 14.7 48.4 0.5 17.3 
 
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R. 
B.(2007), International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005, 6th ed., 
Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper utilises a new critical juncture framework to help us 
determine whether changes to Mexican macroeconomic policy in the 
early 1980s, and Brazilian macroeconomic policy at the turn of the 
century, were clean breaks with the past, or continuations of previously 
established policy pathways. The framework consists of three elements, 
which must be identified in sequence in order to declare, with some 
certainty, if an event was a critical juncture.  These are crisis, ideational 
change, and radical policy change. 
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